Turkey's global project has already become a serious geopolitical factor
While the world's attention is focused on high-level negotiations between the US and Russia and also between the US and China, in the shadow of these events Turkey continues to develop its Turkic World project.
Photo: Natalia Gubernatorova
The latter, which is “materialized” in the Organization of Turkic States (OTG), which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as full members, as well as Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers, extends from Europe to China. If we do not focus on the political but on the ethnographic maps of the world, one of which was recently introduced to Turkish President Erdogan by the leader of the Turkish nationalists Bahcheli, then we see that the Turkish world is much wider and covers much of Russia.
The Turkish world is being studied at Turkish general education schools according to the same maps of the Turkish world, which were not approved by the local Ministry of Education yesterday. These Turkish maps have been translated into Russian and published in a book signed as early as 2017, but the Russian analytical community is always nervous about their subsequent public appearances.
Now, after the Turkish Summit on November 12, 2021, the participating countries have agreed not only to translate their alphabets into Latin, not only to terminologically approximate their languages ”for a better understanding of the Turkish nations of the world”, but also to jointly develop common textbooks on Turkish history and geography. and literature. They are unlikely to be too complementary in the Russian and Soviet pasts of the Turkish states – it is good that they are neutral in their assessments.
Against this background, Russia is showing enviable public peace about the integration processes of the Turkish world, which is officially limited to remarks that its own, and therefore the center of the Turkish world, is the Russian Altai. At the same time, a statement that “there is nothing wrong with communicating with relatives.”
However, it can be stated that the zone of Russian strategic interests declared by Russia after the collapse of the USSR largely overlaps with “. With such a loud nickname, Turkish officials characterize the integration processes of the Turkish world.
These processes are accelerating after Azerbaijan's victory last year with Turkey's direct support in Nagorno-Karabakh. And let the laurels of Russia's mediator remain, it was Turkey that became the architect of the Azerbaijani victory. In particular, the “Bayraktar” drones (UAVs) delivered by Turkey to Azerbaijan were declared a “weapon of victory” and a change of game, a weapon that “changed the course of the game” – not just a specific war and the modern paradigm of warfare.
There is another big client for Turkish drones – Ukraine, which has already managed not only to buy Bayraktars, but to use them in the sky over the Donbas. The Russian side has expressed concern about the illegal use of UAVs by Ukraine in the conflict zone, and the very issue of Bayraktar's delivery was raised in a telephone conversation between Presidents Putin and Erdogan on December 3.
Among the lines of official press releases, it can be read that the Russian side drew the Turkish side's attention to the fact that Bayraktar's deliveries were made by Turkey to an “inadequate” client. And she indicated that it was better for Turkey to refrain from further supplies in this turn of history, which could damage Russian-Turkish relations. It is clear that the Russian leadership expects Turkey to appreciate its “special relationship” with Russia and to “slow down” in Ukraine.
But does such “persuasion” work for Turkey? Note that Turkey is also building a “special relationship” with Ukraine. Should we expect Ankara to listen to Moscow and follow the example of responsible arms suppliers who refrain from selling to countries involved in armed conflict?
Let's start by saying that the Bayraktar UAV in Turkey is more than a weapon, it is a symbol of Turkish dominance in the arms market, which is to be reflected in the country's growing political influence on the world stage.
In their marketing, Turkish drones “stand on the shoulders of the giant” – the Russian defense industry, increasing its attractiveness by the widespread destructive shots in recent years, regardless of age and with what control, but Russian equipment Turkish drones.
This contributes to the increased interest in Turkish products by Russian antagonists, including the Baltic countries and, for example, Poland. We are not talking about Ukraine: it has reached an agreement with Turkey to set up a joint venture to manufacture and maintain Turkish equipment. In addition, among the potential buyers of Turkish drones are the countries themselves – members of the Organization of Turkish States.
Today, Turkish drones claim to play almost the same role for Turkey as the advanced Ottoman siege artillery during the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. With the capture of Constantinople, the Ottoman state changed to the Ottoman Empire, which later reached the Viennese walls. The Republic of Turkey is using its drones to transform it from a regional to a global power.
Will Turkey, with such “initial data” based on Russian concerns, “dose” its arms supplies to the countries that make up the Turkish world, which the country began to diligently build with the collapse of the USSR? And let the reader not think that Ukraine is not part of that world. Not to mention the past Ottoman ownership of these countries, Ukraine is often mentioned as a possible OTG observer country, and President Zelensky himself seriously declares “the special historical nature of Turkish-Ukrainian relations.” Not at all, considering Ilya Repin's painting “The Cossacks are writing a letter to the Turkish Sultan.”
From this “tactical” problem of concrete supplies of specific weapons to the strategic level, a fundamental question can be asked for our country: do the integration processes in the Turkish world, which has already become a geopolitical factor, a threat to Russia? – both its interests and its territorial integrity? After all, Turkish drones in the post-Soviet space are only a special manifestation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy.
For many years, the implementation of joint strategic projects between Russia and Turkey, including the construction of the Akkuyu and Turkish Stream nuclear power plants, the supply of S-400 systems, the creation of a joint venture in Turkey to produce Sputnik V vaccine, etc., was believed, as well as Turkey's serious economic interest in Russia. in the areas of construction, tourism and trade, it will contribute to constructivity in the Russian-Turkish dialogue and offset the emerging differences. This calculation was not justified in 2015, when the Turks shot down a Russian plane in the sky over Syria. However, the ensuing harsh reaction and sanctions have forced Russia to force Turkey to accept what has been accepted as an “apology.”
However, as a result of what you see, the strategic projects of Russian-Turkish cooperation, if there is a deterrent “anti-confrontational” force, is not unlimited and only applies to the threat of direct confrontation. This means that these projects do not have a compensatory effect in the event of a soft expansion that Turkey has been practicing for decades.
In recent years, the often demonstrated Russian “fi” against the Turks still reminds us of the proverb “And Vaska listens and eats.” Paying homage to the Turkish side, “Turkish Vaska” in the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, has seized its historic opportunities, working hard on its national ideas and on its own integration project to offer it to the good half of the post-Soviet space. And as you can see, this proposal of the Turks was not only accepted with interest, but also “put to work”.
Why is post-Soviet space so quickly, by historical standards, “tied” to the Turkish project?
If we look at the root of this problem, we will see a situation similar to the case with the Turkish drones: we are talking about the creation of a “shield” or, if it sounds too harsh, “alternatives” of Russia.
And this Turkish alternative is a reality that Russia should now take for granted and compete with, but not at the level of attempts to “influence Turkey” that many politicians in Moscow are thinking about. I will express a purely personal opinion that there is no “silver bullet” or, I paraphrase in mainstream Russian-Turkish relations, one “silver tomato” which, if Russia were to throw the Turks, would force Turkey to deviate from its intended path.
Unfortunately, those who are used to simple recipes will have to compete in terms of the success of their own national ideas, in terms of demonstrating their own successes, in terms of developing their own integration projects. We no longer live in an indisputable world, crammed into the framework of a rigid “step left – step right” paradigm. We will not be able – then all the gloomy predictions not only about the post-Soviet space, but also about the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation will leave the category of “alarmism” and become a reality. So, as Churchill said, “I can offer you nothing but blood, hard work, tears and sweat” …