Will the Biden administration manage to reach an agreement with Tehran?
Another round of talks between Iran and international mediators began in Vienna on November 29. At the heart of the discussion is a joint comprehensive action plan (the so-called “nuclear agreement”). The agreement was met by an unenviable fate, and JCPOA participants are trying to compromise for the seventh time. However, the experience of previous meetings and their consequences clearly show that breakthroughs cannot be expected even now.
President of Iran Ibrahim Raisi. Photo: AP
The nuclear agreement from 2015 was signed by the Iranian authorities and representatives of the so-called 5 + 1 countries (Great Britain, China, Russia, USA, France and Germany).
The plan meant curtailing Iran's nuclear program & ndash; in addition to reliable peaceful intentions, & mdash; and the international community has committed itself to gradually lifting sanctions in response. Although the process came to a halt, some kind of dialogue continued not only at summits but also at informal consultations (the last one took place on 27 November, by the way), and many experts noted that Tehran seemed seriously prepared for compromises.
The situation spiraled out of control with President Donald Trump coming to power in the United States in 2016, which is known for much tougher rhetoric in the Iranian direction than its predecessor Barack & nbsp; Obama.
The Trump administration, as promised by the then-new leader during the election campaign, withdrew from the agreement two years later, making it clear that this would only increase sanctioning pressure on Tehran. Many have associated this with an active pro-Israel lobby in the United States, with the same position as Obama, who has earned the reputation of being the worst American president for the Jewish state in Israel.
The rest of the participants in the process have repeatedly stated that one country's actions cannot distance themselves from such documents (in justice, for example, under Trump, the United States left the Paris Climate Agreement, but it did not cease to exist). However, from the Iranian point of view, the situation has gone too far and Tehran has declared its full right to return to building production capacity & mdash; which he began to do.
The meeting in the Austrian capital did not fundamentally change the situation, despite the seemingly more accommodating than its predecessor Trump, US President Joseph & nbsp; Biden.
This is especially the view of Islamabad expert Tom Hussein, whose article was published on the eve of the Vienna summit by the Hong Kong authoritative newspaper South China Morning Post (SCMP). According to the analyst, the Americans came to the meeting with one goal: to control the Iranian leadership and to suggest the possibility of extending sanctions in the event of a threat to the White House's regional partners.
For Tehran, as has been said repeatedly and openly, the crucial issue is to return to the terms of the JCPOA, one way or another, by all its participants.
In light of the confrontation between China and the United States & nbsp; The Chinese will certainly support Iran, but this & nbsp; it can only further worsen the already cloudless relationship between Beijing and Washington.
According to diplomats, the seventh round of talks on Iran's nuclear problem is likely to take longer than the previous one. The head of diplomacy of the European Union, Josep Borrell, spoke more optimistically and allowed a return to the first, agreed version of the agreement.
Finally, the Israeli factor cannot be written off. The country's Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has already warned: if he returns to the JCPOA, meaning that Iran will again declare a reduction in uranium enrichment, etc., the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities will remain potential targets for the Israeli armed forces.
In general, the balance of power is so far that it would be naive to expect a momentary and, at best, compromise solution from Vienna. Perhaps the most optimal outcome of the negotiations will be at least the framework questions for the next negotiations. Of course, unless the differences between the parties to the process become even more violent.