The revolution was defeated. What after the revolution?
“The revolution has a beginning, the revolution has no end” – Alexander Lukashenko, who created many political and contradictions during his time in Minsk, proved that this seemingly iron rule does not always work and does not apply everywhere. A year ago, after adding up the official results of the presidential election, a real revolution began in Belarus. A strong wave of protest approached the removal of the Old Man from the chair of the head of state, and then abruptly subsided as if she were not there. The fateful battle for the future of Belarus did not end at all, but only changed into another form – a form of patient play for a long time, behind-the-scenes maneuvers and political war of extermination.
One year after the “revolution” in August 2020 is still headed by Alexander Lukashenko. Photo: president.gov.by
“The door will open, Joe Biden will come in and bring me a bunch of White House cookies.” Svetlana, we have some beautiful cookies. “Refresh yourself!” -A similar mise-en-scène with the participation of the symbol of the Belarusian opposition Svetlana Tichanovska was carried out in the American White House on purpose. With such a half-joke, the Kremlin sent an extremely serious political signal: at this stage, you have won in Belarus, but nothing is over yet.
“Svetlane, we have wonderful cookies. ” Refresh yourself! “: The most interesting moment of Biden's meeting with Tichanovska seems to have gone without photography.
The political outbreak in Minsk in August 2020 was only indirectly linked to the country's geopolitical games. The energy of the protest was not directed against Moscow, but against Alexander Lukashenko, a leader who at the time could hardly be called a “pro-Russian politician.” However, much has changed in the last year. The old man lost his freedom of maneuver, his ability to pursue a “multi-vector foreign policy,” and to flirt with Russia's geopolitical enemies. Moscow has decided to forget about the old complaints and hug Lukashenko. Belarus is in the orbit of Russian politics. But what are our real possibilities to influence the present and future of this “planet”? How long can we not lose?
Boils inside
In the summer of 1994, the then leader of Belarus, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, unfortunately lost the presidential election. This is how Kebich described in his memoirs what happened next – the second night after the election and more than a week before Alexander Lukashenko became head of state: “The penetrating telephone call woke up at two in the morning. The security chief answered the phone. Only his voice can be heard. But from the short notes, it was easy to guess what it was all about: “I'm listening to you! .. Yes, the protection of Prime Minister Kebich … I can't tell him, the Prime Minister is resting … The Prime Minister The Minister's driver is also asleep and will not go anywhere … I repeat: the driver is resting and will not go anywhere. Wait until morning … No, I won't give you a car. The Prime Minister will need it tomorrow … I warn you: if someone tries to disrupt the Prime Minister's peace, his bodyguard will take adequate measures in accordance with the regulations. Good night! “There was no time to sleep. I put on my pajamas and went to the head of security. He said that, referring to the instructions of the presidential headquarters, the head of the garage of the Council of Ministers demanded the immediate delivery of my official car.”
Such impatience can be attributed to the lack of good morals of the newly elected President of Belarus. But in my opinion, Alexander Lukashenko's approach to etiquette standards should be considered secondary. The primary is the instinct of power, which is very well developed in the old man. In the same memories, Vyacheslav Kebich indulged in sad thoughts: “Couldn't I lose? Of course, he could … If only he had made full use of, and for perfectly legitimate reasons, administrative resources, as is now being done here, in Russia, in other countries. I didn't do it out of stupidity. I hoped for my headquarters, the headquarters hoped for the local authorities, the local authorities hoped for chance … If I asked the state media not to forget their status and pour less dirt on the authorities. If I only took the money that rich people offered me once, he hired professional political strategists and encouraged activists of initiative groups who collected signatures for me. I wanted to fight honestly, and I left all such proposals aside. “
Such a reflection is deeply foreign to Alexander Lukashenko. In politics, it is always focused only on victory – and at all costs. Last year's iconic television film – Lukashenko getting out of a helicopter with a submachine gun in his hand – seemed comical to some in Russia. But a civilian guy with a submachine gun can look ridiculous until he starts firing. Lukashenko, as you know, never started. But if necessary, he was accurately, mentally, and physically ready to do so.
The “hand of Moscow” played a huge role in the fact that the current regime in Belarus survived. Putin's statement on the creation of a “law enforcement reserve” in Russia, which can be introduced into Belarus if necessary. Massive aid in the information, economic and political spheres – if all this did not happen, then the system of power in the neighboring country could now look completely different. But in order to make proper use of the Kremlin's help, one must also represent something. Lukashenko is a true “god of political war” in his ability to stay in power and find ingenious ways to avenge his perpetrators. Take, for example, Lithuania, exhausted by the onslaught of illegal immigrants from third world countries crossing the wide-open Belarusian border. Who but Lukashenko could think of such a rude but very painful way of revenge?
Of course, this “god of political war” did not come to the 2020 elections in the best shape and with a dysfunctional system of friend or enemy identification. However, the political storm that Lukashenko had to go through again worsened his fighting qualities. The nature and depth of the current social stabilization in Belarus can be debated. Some talk about the massive disappointment of last year's protest leaders, their ideas and slogans. Some point out that the anger of the protesters is only driven into the depths and can erupt at any opportunity, which will certainly be reflected sometime.
The question of how much political resources Lukashenko has left is also controversial. On the one hand, Belarus has been leading for over 27 years. On the other hand, the last day of August this year, the old man will be 67 years old. By comparison, legendary Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ruled his country until he turned 78. And then, disappointed by his two substitutes, he returned to the post of Prime Minister shortly before his 93rd birthday and retired two years later.
For ardent supporters of Alexander Lukashenko in our capital, these two facts – the disappearance of visible protests in Belarus and the fact that Old Man has a theoretical chance of breaking Mahathir Mohamad's managerial longevity record – may be reason enough to say: the political crisis in a neighboring country is over! We won! I strongly disagree with this analysis. Lukashenko's political survival interests and Russia's strategic interests in Belarus are, after all, completely different operas. But even if we really had one “opera” for two, a country like ours does not have the right to “tie” its interests to the interests of one individual politician.
Negotiations on the details of economic cooperation between Moscow and Minsk sometimes resemble a garnish against which two presidents speak. But our countries really need each other. Photo: president.gov.by
The question needs to be asked more broadly: to what extent does the dynamics of social processes and generational change in Belarus correspond to long-term Russian interests? The attempt to understand the balance of power between the three main support groups in Belarusian society gives us nothing special. It is known that the largest of these groups is the “party” with the conventional name “we don't care who is in power only if they pay good wages and pensions.” According to experts, this group is much “heavier” in terms of its specific weight than both, the rest – “red-green” (active supporters of Lukashenko – according to the colors of the current national flag of Belarus) and “white-red-white”, or if I use Belarusian abbreviation, “Bachbeshnik” (opponents of Lukashenko-according to the colors of the country's national flag until 1995). It is also known that each of these two warring political camps is a closed information bubble, not very ready to accept arguments from outside. With a certain (but not absolute) share of trust, it can also be argued that “red-greens” are now on the rise and “white-red-white” are in a state of psychological frustration. That's about it.
But the attempt to look at Belarusian society from a different angle, on the contrary, brings very clear and from the Russian point of view quite alarming results. At the end of July this year, the Kiev sociological group “Evaluation” published the results of a regular survey of socio-political attitudes of the Ukrainian population. Respondents were also asked about their position on Vladimir Putin's thesis on the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian nations. In your opinion, what age group has found the largest number of those who agree with this position of the President of the Russian Federation – 44%? You will never guess: among young people aged 18 to 29 – those who grew up during Ukraine's independence and formed as a person against the background of the growing persecution of the Russian language and Russian culture.
As Igor Guzhva, editor-in-chief of the Kiev internet publication Strana.ua, wrote on social networks, such unexpected results have a completely logical explanation: “The younger generation does not draw information from television, but from the Internet and social networks. And in the second case, not from politicized social networks like Facebook, but from TikTok and Instagram. And in this area – the only Russian-speaking area where people from Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Astana, Kharkov, Novosibirsk, etc. communicate in the same language and on general topics (including music and games). And it is very difficult for them to understand why they should consider each other enemies. “
You are happy? Now is the time to get upset. Unfortunately, the most skeptical in the Russian age group in Belarus is the youth. The new generations of Belarusians do not see the enemy in Russia in their flesh and at the same time do not perceive our country as a center of attraction or role model. However, Poland, a country that has taken over the role of coordinator of the West's collective policy towards Belarus, is perceived.
“The Poles were able to build the image of a successful and modern European state,” a partner from the Minsk state apparatus told me with complete regret. But let's not push our hands forward. Russia has trumps in Belarus that it has not yet used.
Their trumps against ours
In April of this year, I wandered in Moscow for an exhibition in the Russian Federal Archives and came across a very curious document – a call to the inhabitants of the “Mayor of Minsk” of August 7, 1919: “In the coming days, the population of Minsk will have the luck to welcome the head of Poland and the supreme leader Joseph Pilsudski. His irresistible will brought us victorious Polish troops to free us from the bloody slavery of the Bolsheviks. With extraordinary effort and excessive work, he built the Polish state, a state which, when free and strong today, brings us all warm care and help … And that is why I express my deep hope that at the moment of the beloved leader's arrival in Minsk, cities … will actively participate in his salute. “
his greetings “: Jozef Pilsudski in Minsk, 1919. Photo: en.wikipedia.org
The current Polish “beloved leader” Jaroslaw Kaczynski has enough sense not to address the “population of the city of Minsk” in a similar style. The style is different now. “Poland is responsible for its closest neighbors,” said Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki's office after the start of the acute phase of the political crisis in Belarus last August. But the essence does not change. Warsaw's political, economic and information expansion is taking place, albeit more elegantly, but no less persistently than in Piłsudski's time.
In 2007, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Polish State Television created BelSat, a satellite television channel focused on a neighboring country, which broadcasts in Belarusian. In the same year, the parliament in Warsaw approved the law on the “Polish Card” – a document confirming the affiliation of foreign citizens to the “Polish people”. This magic card allows its owner to work legally in Poland without obtaining a special permit, run business activities there under the same conditions as local citizens, use the free Polish state education system, etc.
Formally, this program is now aimed at citizens of all countries of the world. But the statistics speak for themselves. For 2019, the first place in the number of issued “Polish cards” is Belarus – 143,955, the second Ukraine – 120,052 and the third Kazakhstan – 3084. If you remember that the entire population of Belarus is less than ten million people, it turns out that “card “Poles” gained more than one percent of the country's population. To obtain this document, you must either present a certificate confirming “active participation in the promotion of the Polish language and culture for three years”, or prove the presence of Polish ancestors or relatives.
The latter is a big problem for several people in Belarus. When, between the two world wars, the whole of western Belarus was part of Poland, the local indigenous population was subjected to forced assimilation in various ways – the closure of national schools, the colonization of names and surnames in documents, the dismissal of “bad” religions. The last duke of the Bialystok region in the history of pre-war Poland, the owner of Karniz's proud nickname – Heinrich Ostashevsky (once had to jump out of a window to escape a crowd of rioting workers) – wrote in a report to his bosses in 1939: without state traditions … He must think Polish and learn Polish in the spirit of Polish statehood. “
The last duke of the Bialystok region, Heinrich Ostashevsky (pictured right): “The Belarusian population is a passive mass without a national identity.” Photo: en.wikipedia.org
However, the strongest trump card of modern “Polish statehood” is the economic success of this country. Between 1989 and 2018, Polish GDP grew by 826.96%, which is the best in Europe. According to World Bank statistics, Poland has been permanently on the list of countries with a high income level since 2009 (Russia was included in this list only once – in 2012 and left in 2013). In terms of per capita, Polish GDP is $ 35,957, Russian GDP is $ 29,485 and Belarusian GDP is $ 20,578. Of course, the difference between Poland and Russia does not look very dramatic, but there is a gap. In addition, these numbers are the average temperature in the hospital. And here is the temperature that the average Belarusian sees from his bell tower. The Russian regions of Bryansk, Pskov and Smolensk bordering its country are among the most economically depressed regions of the Russian Federation and have the worst demographic development.
The Polish card is a powerful tool of political and economic expansion of Warsaw to Belarus and Ukraine. Photo: en.wikipedia.org
Success attracts. What can Russia face in the thrust of Poland's success? Surprisingly a lot. For example, the fact that if Belarus follows the “European path” that Warsaw is constantly pushing for, then it will not get the results that Poland itself received in its time. As the great scientist on this country, political scientist Yuri Solozobov, told me, there are several reasons for the Polish economic miracle.
Poland has managed to create an economy that is not dominated by oligarchs, but small and medium-sized enterprises are thriving. Poland has managed to create an agrarian industry competitive in European conditions, built again on the latifund. But do you remember the anecdote about a multimillionaire born in a poor family who was asked to share the secret of his business success: “When I was a little boy, my mother once gave me an apple for breakfast. I sold it and bought two apples for the proceeds. I also sold them and bought four apples for the proceeds. And then my rich uncle left me a million dollars in inheritance! In the case of Poland, the role of such a “rich and generous uncle” was the European Union – or more precisely the main financial sponsor of the EU, Germany.
At a time when many countries of the former socialist camp were headlessly running into the European Union and agreeing to any conditions, even if they were admitted to this “club of the rich”, the Poles negotiated the conditions of their entry long and hard. As a result, Warsaw has for many years been the largest recipient of multibillion-dollar free financial assistance from the so-called EU Structural Funds. Were the Poles very cool in this regard? Definitely. But it's not just their steepness. It is also a deliberate policy of one of the main financial donors of these funds – Germany. It was advantageous for the Germans to turn their great neighbor and partner into an economically strong power. They have invested in such a transformation and are now “receiving dividends from their investments.” For example, the volume of German exports to Poland is almost three times the volume of German exports to Russia.
Why can't this “rich uncle” play a similar role in relation to Belarus? Because our “uncle” cracked – he cut off and now speaks in the following style through his chief diplomat Josep Borrell: “The European Union is not a charity or an ATM.” This particular statement was, of course, addressed directly to Vladimír Zelenský. However, there is now a 'dirty secret' in European politics, which is known to everyone and everyone, but which is considered rude to speak out loud. The secret is that the last major enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 was a mistake. Unlike agile Poles, many former socialist countries were not prepared to join the “club of the rich.” The European Union has bitten far more than it could have swallowed. The EU has so far failed to get rid of this political and economic “digestive disorder”.
In the current reality in connection with the EU, Belarus shines as an exploited “poor relative”. In connection with Russia, Belarus can avoid deindustrialization, depopulation, destruction of the social structure of society. The problems of economic interaction between Moscow and Minsk are well known. Eternal disputes about who owes whom how much and who feeds and supports whom. Mutual misunderstanding caused by different models of economic governance in both countries. And I just started listing it. However, our economies are still compatible and complementary. If Russia manages to play its cards properly, then the issue of integration will become its main trump card, and if it fails, then the main zone of vulnerability.
With Russia but not in Russia
In the memoirs of the first foreign minister of independent Belarus, Petr Kravchenko, published fifteen years ago, there is one extremely spicy fragment: “In 1997, I had an interesting conversation with one of Russia's main leaders. He told me:
– You know, the only country in the post-Soviet area from which they report for free is Belarus. In Tajikistan, we have to buy officials, in Georgia all the more, and your own running, of our own free will. We do not ask, but they pass – governors, ministers, prime ministers, pass Lukashenko …
– Why do you think? – It caught my attention.
– Yes, for the simple reason that most Belarusian officials do not yet believe in Belarusian statehood. And for each case, they prepare the back.
Maybe it was still at the beginning of this century. But over the last two decades, the situation has changed radically. Someone in Moscow can still think in the logic of “a chicken is not a bird, Belarus is not abroad” by inertia. But Belarus itself feels completely different. State and national identities have been created in the country. I recently asked my acquaintance from the Minsk state apparatus, seemingly, a technical question – how far is the idea that both countries have a single emission center located in Moscow? Here is his answer: “The emission center is one of the elements of independence. It may not really be needed, but because it does, it means it should be. No one is ready to give up independence. For example, we are not ready to change our blue Belarusian passports to your red ones. We have grown up for several generations who know no other life than living in an independent country. I personally grew up in the USSR. I'm ready to connect. But those born after 1985 have completely different views. “
While walking around Ufa in 2007, I was somewhat distorted by posters hanging everywhere: “450 years with Russia”. In this slogan, I saw – perhaps completely unjustly – I saw a hidden allusion to the claim of the then leadership of Bashkortostan to individuality. However, what is ambiguous in relation to the subject of the Russian Federation is the only correct basis for Moscow's policy towards Belarus. Along with Russia. Near Russia. But not in Russia. In any case, our country should not be seen as a force that poses a threat to Belarus' sovereignty and independence.
Is the Russian political class always sensitive to these nuances? I'm not sure. I will give another extremely important quote from an acquaintance of mine from the Minsk state apparatus: “People do not understand exactly where the border that cannot be crossed in relations with Russia is. The fewer people are informed about specific integration agreements, the greater their suspicions. “
Vigilance is certainly not a feeling that the citizens of Belarus should feel from Russia. The version of her neighbor's “European future”, which, from my preconceived but sincere point of view, promoted by Warsaw, is definitely an empty shell. But this pacifier has a clear, beautiful and attractive packaging. You can, of course, argue: they say that what is inside the package is much more important than the package itself. But in order to “appreciate the difference”, the packaging must first be expanded, right?
Judging by the talks I have had, the Russian elite understands the complexity and delicacy of the task facing our country in the Belarusian direction of its policy. For example, a prominent representative of the Russian state apparatus told me: “Moscow does not insist on any in-depth form of political unification. The maximum that can be talked about – even then in the distant future – is a kind of confederation while maintaining the independence of both countries. If anyone in Belarus thinks differently, then these people are still living in the Yeltsin period in history, when there really were all sorts of different ideas. Now Moscow is talking about something completely different. Now Moscow is talking about economic cooperation in all its forms, each of which brings only one positive thing to Belarus – for example, in the form of further economic development, job creation and even greater expansion of the sales market for Belarusian goods. The sooner our colleagues in Minsk realize this, the better it will be for Belarus. “
Of course you can promise anything. But here are the numbers that are more eloquent than any rhetorical pleasure. We are talking about economic cooperation between the two countries between 2009 and 2019. Belarus' savings on the preferential costs of Russian oil and gas received $ 70.244 billion. Concessional government loans from Moscow to Minsk – $ 16.4 billion. Belarus's agricultural and industrial exports to Russia amount to USD 111.26 billion. The last item may seem exaggerated in this list. But in reality, it is almost the most important thing. Belarus does not have alternative markets for its products in such volumes and is not expected. Do I still need to prove that we need each other?
I fought for a long time for a clear, logical and convincing ending of this material, but I never achieved anything. Therefore, I have not achieved that the end of the current game for a long time in Belarus is completely unclear. The future is always shrouded in fog. But in relation to a neighboring country, this is doubly true. Alexander Lukashenko managed to freeze the situation. But how long will this freeze work? And in what state will Belarus emerge from this? There are questions, but no answers yet.